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AMERICAN FOREIGN LAW
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Panel Discussion:
“Litigation in the U.S. and in the Civil Law System:
What can we learn from each other?”
Opening remarks of James R. Maxeiner*
Drake Hotel, New York City
March 15, 1995
I.
Our meeting is very timely. Civil justice reform
was on the front page of the New York Times
almost every day last week. The House of Representatives passed three law and litigation reform measures: “The Common Sense Product
Liability and Legal Reform Act,” the “Attorney
Accountability Act,” and the “Securities Litigation Reform Act.” According to the Times, “the
Clinton Administration has decided to wage a
vigorous fight against legislation that would
drastically reshape the nation’s legal system …”1
The Administration apparently regards the Republican proposals as so extreme that they would
“tilt the legal playing field dramatically to the
disadvantage of consumers and middle-class
citizens.”2
What is the drastic reshaping that the Clinton
Administration is fighting? The challenged
measures would “set Federal standards in all
product-injury lawsuits, even those decided by
state courts; would impose strict limits on punitive damages in all civil cases, and would require
the loser in many lawsuits to pay the legal costs
of the winner.”3 Are these reforms really so drastic? One thing we can learn from Civil Law systems, I think, is that these so-called reforms are
not really so drastic. If we look to the European
Union, which is not exactly known for hostility
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to consumers and middle-class citizens, we see
that in the EU there are Union standards for
product injury lawsuits, even those decided in
state courts, generally no punitive damages, and
requirements that the loser pay the legal costs of
the winner. On the other hand, comparison with
European practices could well inform the Republicans’ proposals in at least two respects. (1) The
Republican proposals are, like so much of
American law reform, piecemeal and unsystematic; they address only a few small aspects of the
litigation crisis and only for parts of the system.
(2) The Republican proposals are generally not
very well thought out. Cost-shifting is a good
example of both of these points. It is to apply
only to diversity cases. The proposals scarcely
begin to deal with issues, such as determining
the extent of the costs to be shifted, that have
occupied much legislation and many decisions in
those countries that have cost shifting.
II.
The subtitle of today’s meeting is: “what can we
learn from each other?” The title is an optimistic
one for it assumes that we are willing to learn
from others. American lawyers have not shown
much interest in learning from other systems of
procedure. Almost twenty years ago, AFLA
member Rudolf Schlesinger made “A Plea for
Utilizing Foreign Experience” in the area of
criminal procedure.4 His plea drew little response. Ten years ago, Professor John Langbein,
now of Yale, argued for “The German Advan-
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tage in Civil Procedure”5 and drew responses
ranging from (1) you’re wrong, there is no advantage,6 through (2) you exalt efficiency too
much, inefficiency is better,7 to (3) you may be
right, but there is no way that we can adopt what
they do here.8 Two years ago, our distinguished
moderator, Whit Gray, at a convention of the
Association of American Law Schools, called on
his colleagues to investigate German civil procedure. Yet all the principal reports on reform of
civil procedure—the Quayle Commission, the
Congressional Federal Courts Study Committee,
the American Bar Association Blue Print, and
the Brookings Institution Study—essentially pay
foreign procedure no mind at all.
Why are we not interested in learning from foreign civil procedure? Already in 1929, Edson
Sunderland, who was one of the principal drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, explained our lack of interest as a result of (1)
“professional prejudice against new ideas, based
on national conservation and the monopolistic
nature of judicial agencies,” and (2) ignorance,
because Americans aren’t good linguists and
relevant materials are not readily available in
English.”9 These explanations are as valid as
ever. In particular, professional prejudice against
new ideas is particularly pronounced in the area
of civil procedure. What Professor Schlesinger
wrote of criminal procedure applies equally well
to civil procedure: “U.S. lawyers are possessed
by a feeling of superiority that seems to grow in
direct proportion to the ever increasing weight of
the accumulating evidence demonstrating the
total failure of our system …”10
There is, I think, another reason why U.S. lawyers are not interested in foreign civil procedure.
American lawyers tend to be a very practical
bunch of individuals. Still stronger than the practical-orientation is their practice orientation. If an
idea can not be plugged in to be used instantly, it
does not have much appeal. Comparing U.S.
civil procedure with European Civil Law civil
5
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-2procedure therefore creates problems. They are
two very different systems and it is very hard to
look at any single element in isolation and sensibly transfer it to a discussion of civil procedure
in the other jurisdiction. This problem of viewing a solution in context is not peculiar to comparative procedure, but it may be a bit more pronounced there and therefore more an obstacle in
learning from others.
III.
It is, of course, a fundamental objective of our
Association to strive to counteract professional
prejudice against foreign legal ideas and to promote learning from foreign experiences.11 On
this, the 70th anniversary of our Association, I
would like to draw attention to some comments
of one of our association’s earliest and most
steadfast of foreign members, Pierre LePaulle.
LePaulle was a French Avocat à la Cour d’Appel
de Paris who spent some time at Harvard Law
School in the 1920s. When it was that he first
joined the Association, I don’t know, but it was
very soon after our founding. He was on the oldest membership list I have—from 1934—as one
of just 75 members total and one of only three
members residing abroad. He remained on the
membership roster through to 1976.
LePaulle was keenly aware of the American lack
of interest in foreign law in general and in civil
procedure in particular. He began an article that
he published in the Harvard Law Review in 1922
with the observation that “One of the first things
to strike a foreigner who comes in contact with
American lawyers is the general lack of interest
in questions of comparative law.”12
LePaulle was, as I think most comparativists and
most of us here are, a great believer in the value
of comparative law even when there is no possibility or intention to borrow directly from the
foreign legal system. LePaulle ended the article I
just mentioned by calling attention to how
knowledge of foreign law gives one new perspective on one’s own system. He stated that he
never completely understood French law before
coming to the United States and studying our
system. “When one is immersed in his own law,
in his own country, unable to see things from
11
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without, he has a psychologically unavoidable
tendency to consider as natural, as necessary, as
given by God, things which are simply due to
historical accident or temporary social situation.
… To see things in their true light, we must see
them from a certain distance, as strangers, which
is impossible when we study any phenomena of
our own country.”13 If we could persuade our
American (and European) colleagues of this
benefit, we would be well on the way toward
answering the question, “what can we learn from
each other?”
IV.
So what can we learn from each other? LePaulle
called on American lawyers to take advantage of
what the Civil Law has done in the area of civil
procedure. He expressed “his amazement at the
ineffective manner in which justice is administered … more like a high church ceremony
than a business transaction.”14 Writing more
recently of the German system of civil procedure, John Langbein made a similar comparison:
“German civil proceedings have the tone not of
theatre, but of a routine business meeting—
serious rather than tense.”15 In the interest of full
disclosure, I want to say now that in making specific comparisons, I am limiting my remarks to
the two systems in which I have received formal
legal schooling: the U.S. and the German. In the
discussion that follows, some of the others present today may be able to say whether the comparisons I draw apply to other Civil Law systems
of civil procedure.
When one sees both systems from afar, then
LePaulle’s distinction jumps out. One does not
have to call it ceremony versus business. In a
less provocative sound bite, one could draw a
distinction between focusing on providing a
day-in-court versus focusing on providing a
reasoned decision. The integrity of the process,
in the American system, rests squarely on the
opportunity of the parties to participate in it.16 In
the German system, the integrity of the process
rests rather more on the product of that process
and rather less on active participation in the
process itself than does the American.
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American lawyers are skeptical of an objective
application of preexisting rules to a case and
therefore tend to emphasize more the importance
of telling one’s story to a neutral fact-finder. In
discussing the Rule of Law, American jurisprudential scholars have spoken of two poles of
importance in adjudication somewhat analogous
to the distinction between day-in-court and reasoned decision: they speak of courts versus
rules. They denigrate as a mere “pretense” the
idea that “the law is a system of known rules
applied by a judge”.17 For them, civil procedure
is fair because the parties receive a day-in-court.
As a result, our law is concerned, perhaps an
outside observer might even say consumed, with
what we think essential to a day-in-court. We
worry about notice and hearing, about intricate
questions of admissible and inadmissible evidence, about prejudicial knowledge of the trierof-fact, and so on. We worry surprisingly little
about what decision itself results. In the end,
judges, both at the trial and appellate levels, are
responsible for assuring that each side had his or
her fair day in court rather than that the decision
is correct.
The German system of civil procedure is less
fixated on a day-in-court. To be sure, there is a
right to be heard (“rechtliches Gehör”), but what
the German system focuses on is the final decision of the Court. In the end, judges, again both
at trial and appellate levels, are responsible for
producing rationally supported decisions. The
goal of German procedure is determination of a
concrete legal situation in a correct judgment.
The day-in-court is just incidental to that goal.
Our fixation with day-in-court I think says a lot
about the political line-up of the supporters and
opponents of the Republicans’ proposals. Corporations are generally little interested in getting a
hearing on some novel theory of law or having
an opportunity to make a pitch to a jury to get it
to decide out of sympathy rather than grounded
in law. Liberal and conservative activists may be
more interested in getting a day-in-court to persuade a judge to come up with a novel interpretation of law. The underinsured may want to
convince a jury to decide out of sympathy to
award a high judgment. Ironically, however, our
enthusiasm for the day-in-court has made that
day-in-court so terribly expensive that it is outof-reach to most of those who do not have the
wealth of O.J. Simpson. What we can learn from
civil law systems, I think, is to put more empha17
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sis on what the Court’s final decision is and less
emphasis on having that elusive day-in-court. I
think if we do, we may achieve more justice and
more days-in-court.
V.
I would like to point out some specific manifestations of day-in-court versus reasoned decision thinking. Each of these, I think, may help us
realize how different our system is from others.
Each of these, I think, would be fertile ground
for investigation of how alternative systems
work.
1. Legal education. My first manifestation may
seem a bit far-fetched: legal education. But the
different orientations of legal procedure are already manifested there. U.S. legal education
trains law students to become advocates. Examinations test issue spotting. German legal education trains law students to become judges. Examinations focus on supporting issue resolution.
One might well wonder whether this leads to
Americans lawyers being more likely to find
areas to dispute, and therefore, to require more
days-in-court.
2. Initial stages of a lawsuit. An American lawsuit is oriented toward eventually going to trial; a
German lawsuit is oriented toward reaching a
final judgment. An American lawsuit begins
with a complaint that has to provide no more
information than “notice” that a claim is made;
it may leave the defendant in the dark about what
the defendant has done that supposedly warrants
a judgment. In the early stages of an American
lawsuit, in preparation for that day-in-court, the
parties conduct discovery to learn what the content of “their case” and the content of “their opponent’s case” will be. The parties need that
information so that they can present their cases
in the most favorable light and without surprises.
In a German lawsuit, the plaintiff must file a
detailed claim that spells out not only the basis
for the claim, but also the evidence that the
plaintiff intends to rely on. In the early stages of
a German lawsuit, the judge reviews the filings
of the parties to make sure that they are both
“permissible” (Zulässig) and “sound” (Schlüssig). These reviews take place in every case. The
judge is required to examine all bases for a claim
and to permit only those to be made which can
seriously be regarded as permissible and sound.
A claim is permissible if it meets all formal prerequisites for litigation, e.g., proper service, jurisdiction, absence of applicable statute of limitations. A claim is sound if the individual assertions of the plaintiff’s submissions satisfy the

abstract elements of the claim. Plaintiffs must
substantiate their allegations. Apparently analogous American pretrial motions are not truly
analogous, both since they occur only on motion
and because judges are most reluctant to grant
these motions which would, in effect, deny
plaintiffs a day-in-court.
3. Control of the case. We speak of, in the
United States, “the plaintiff’s case.” That concept does not fit into the German system of civil
procedure. In Germany, the judge controls the
sequence of the case and considers issues
deemed central first. In the United States, each
side’s lawyers first investigate the case fully in
the discovery stage. Then later, at trial, they present their cases in full, first plaintiff, then defendant. We rarely focus on just how inefficient and
costly this procedure is, but comparison makes
that clear. Suppose a plaintiff in the United
States brings a case involving four different
claims. Each claim requires proof of four different factual elements. One element is common to
all, and the parties dispute it ferociously. In
Germany, the judge would address the common
issue first. Resolution of that issue, which could
be simple and requiring hearing only a witness
or two, could obviate consideration of other,
possibly more complicated issues. Those other
issues could consume months of discovery and
weeks of trial in the United States. Similarly,
because the parties control the case, they may
spend a great deal of time on issues that a judge
would regard as irrelevant or immaterial. They
may see these issues, however, as part of their
day-in-court and as useful means to persuade a
jury to find in their favor.
4. Evidence. In Germany, the court has main
responsibility for gathering and evaluating evidence. The judge prepares the case, serves as
principal examiner and summarizes testimony. In
the United States, each side prepares its own
case for presentation to the court. The judge remains passive, there is no judicial preparation of
the case, the parties’ lawyers serve as principal
examiners, and there are verbatim transcripts of
testimony. It is no wonder that, as a result, depositions and trial testimony here are reckoned in
days and in half days, whereas in Germany, testimony is reckoned in hours and half- hours.
How long does one side really need to crossexamine the other’s witness? It would seem in
the O.J. Simpson trial, weeks!
5. Witnesses. In Germany, witnesses are questioned first by the judge. In the United States,
they are prepared by lawyers beforehand to give
testimony. Testimony there is generally unre-
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hearsed whereas here it is staged. There judges
are concerned with getting the gist of the testimony and commonly repeat back to the witness
what they heard to make sure that they understand what the witness intended and not merely
what the witness said. Here, we try to trap witnesses, get them to look bad, and to say things
that they do not intend to say.
6. Experts. In Germany, expert witnesses are
chosen by the judge and are supposed to be neutral. In the United States, experts are chosen by
the parties. It should not be a wonder that they
function as advocates. We want them to do that
since, in expert testimony as in factual testimony, we feel that each side should have its dayin-court to present its view.18
7. Judgment. In the United States, it is not considered essential to the integrity of civil procedure that reasons be given for the decision rendered.19 Although reasons are regarded as helpful and may be required where a judge decides
without jury, we have not ever generally required them, probably because of the difficulties
perceived in trying to get a reasoned statement
from a body of lay jurors. In German procedure,
a statement of reasons is essential. It is grounds
for mandatory reversal if there is no statement of
reasons.20 The lack of a reasoned opinion makes
appeal to correct an erroneous decision difficult,
since appellate judges can not know what the
trial court based the decision on. It permits juries
to reach compromise verdicts that can have no
basis in law as well as allows them to decide
contrary to law. Jury verdicts will be upheld so
long as there was some evidence to support the
verdict, even though contrary evidence was
nearly overwhelming.
8. Costs of proceedings. The English system of
cost-shifting is so controversial precisely because it is seen to threaten the access of the citizenry to courts. By imposing on the loser the
costs of the proceeding, it is feared we will deter
parties from presenting their cases to the courts.
In most parts of the world, however, the logical
force of cost-shifting is irrefutable. If the purpose of the legal proceeding is to determine a
claim of right, and the claim goes against the
person asserting it, it is only fair that the person
who has the claim of right not be subjected to the

-5costs of the determination. Here, however, with
our fixation of right to a day-in-court we fear,
rightly, that litigants who have to pay for that
day-in-court will be less likely to seek it.
9. Appeal. In the United States, appeal basically
reviews whether the rules of the game were adhered to in the trial court. One could even say,
whether the parties got their day in court. In the
German system, on the other hand, the first level
of appeal is concerned with whether the initial
level’s decision was correct. Consequently, the
appellate court can and does hear witnesses and
take other evidence. Professor Damaška of Yale
has pointed out that in American law “what is
actually reviewed is the propriety of the material
submitted to the decision maker for decision
rather than his ‘correct’ use of it.”21 There are
several deleterious consequences of the American approach for efficient adjudication of which
now I mention only two. (1) If the appellate
court finds an error was committed at trial, ordinarily all that it can do is return the whole case
for a new trial to the trial court. Thus the concept
of ‘harmless error’ to avoid having to so completely waste what has gone on before. (2) In
order to avoid such a drastic consequence, a trial
court is likely to err in its deliberations on the
side of letting parties spend too long with witnesses and make arguments that are indeed frivolous.
VI.
If we would only look at foreign procedure, I
think that we would have a much better understanding of what alternatives there are. We
would realize just how myopic we are. We
would see that proposed “revolutions” in our law
are tame and timid responses to difficult problems.
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